THEORIES OF DREAM FUNCTION

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Some contemporary and psychoanalytic theories of dream function are reviewed. Particular attention is given to Jung's model of personality and theory of dream function, a dynamic, open-system approach that stands in contrast to Freud's mechanistic, drive-reduction model. Contemporary theories tend to focus on the function of environmental mastery, viewed from one of three perspectives: (a) problem solving, (b) information processing, or (c) ego consolidation. Only a few have gone beyond environmental control to consider creative functions of the dream. Most contemporary theories are at least partially supported by data, and many are not mutually exclusive, dealing with different processes or proposing similar processes in different-sounding languages. Some dream theories do differ from others in underlying model, in scope, or in the degree to which nonrational processes are admissible as data. Jung's approach has much to add to contemporary dream theory, particularly in making room for creative and nonrational processes, as well as in the specific proposition that dreams function to balance and complete waking consciousness.

Many answers have been suggested to the question of what function dreams serve in man's psychology. In this century, the most influential theory has been Freud's and his views have given laboratory psychology a fruitful source of hypotheses and debate. The mainstream of American scientific thought in this area has grown directly from laboratory research but is richly sprinkled with Freudian theory together with a Darwinian emphasis on adaptation as environmental mastery. Jung's approach to dream function, very different from Freud's and perhaps more compatible with current research findings, has remained outside the mainstream and is virtually unknown to American psychology. This paper aims to correct the omission, while providing an overview of psychoanalytic and contemporary thought about the function of dreams.

Freud (1953) believed that dreams serve a dual, compromise function. According to his theory, unconscious, instinctual drive energy pushes for discharge, moving toward the expression of a consciously unacceptable impulse. The reduction in conscious restraints characteristic of sleep permits a symbolic, disguised dream expression of the repressed wish. The overt (manifest) content of the dream represents a compromise between the instinctual forces (latent content) striving for expression, on the one hand, and the repressive forces of consciousness, on the other. Freud assumed that the energy pushing for action would awaken the sleeper were it not for the dream which, through symbolic discharge, permits a return to sleep. Thus, the dream is seen as serving the biological function of preserving sleep, as well as the psychological function of discharging an unacceptable wish that might otherwise burst destructively into waking life.

Various aspects of Freud's dream theory have been reviewed from the point of view of contemporary dream research (Bregé, 1967; Fisher, 1965; Foulkes, 1964; Hollander, 1962; Jones, 1958, 1970; Trosman, 1963), and of changes in the philosophy of science. While conclusions vary, it is generally agreed that at least some aspects of the theory must be discarded or revised. With respect to dream function in particular, the sleep preservation view is untenable and the underlying model upon which the wish-fulfillment theory rests requires extensive revision.

It must be emphasized that the psychology of Freud's theoretical model rests on his distinction between manifest and latent dream
content, that is, the assumption that meaning is concealed rather than revealed by the dream. Granting the puzzling, chaotic, and foreign flavor of much dream content, it is more straightforward to assume that the dream is an expression lacking the discriminative order imposed by conscious ("secondary process") thought, and which must therefore be ordered and decoded if it is to be understood within the framework of normal adult thought. Whether dreams disguise, reveal, or are meaningless must remain a question of faith, but most theorists, including many whose work builds upon Freud's (e.g., Adler, Eriksen, Jung, Maeder, and Silberer) incline toward the view that they reveal.

Despite the many problems inherent in his theoretical formulation of dream function, Freud's far-reaching work has provided a fruitful basis for many of the contemporary theories discussed below. Psychologists steeped in the Freudian tradition have generated theories compatible with those arising from the laboratory alone, generally moving away from wish-fulfillment and drive-discharge functions toward an emphasis on adaptation and ego synthesis. Forerunners of this trend are to be found among Freud's original psychoanalytic group and, indeed, can be discerned in Freud's own brilliant interpretative work which, as Jones (1970) has emphasized, often ranges far from the letter of his theory.

A large group of investigators approach the dream as essentially continuous with waking thought. While specifics of the theories vary, each in its own way attributes to the dream the function of facilitating some aspect of the dreamer's mastery over his environment. Environmental mastery is usually approached from one of three points of view: (a) problem solving, (b) information processing, or (c) ego consolidation.

The problem-solving view of dream function was already important to some of Freud's early followers. Maeder (1913), while he believed with Freud that dreams have a drive-discharge function, also saw them as tentative, practice attempts to solve problems. Adler (1936) saw the dream as an expression of the dreamer's characteristic approach to life, his unresolved reality problems and, with Maeder, as an attempt to meet and solve these problems. In addition, Adler believed that dreams arouse emotions that push the dreamer toward problem solution. However, he felt that the solutions embodied in dreams are self-deceptive, constituting a flight from realistic coping with life.

Ullman (1959, 1960, 1962) has built upon Adler's theory but considers that dream content itself constitutes an adaptive contribution to problem solving, rather than a flight from reality. He feels that the dream expresses symbolically the connections between a present problem and relevant aspects of past experience; it permits a fuller assessment and thereby better solution to the problem than is available to waking consciousness alone. Ullman also looks at the adaptive value of the dream for species survival, assuming that the apparent lightening of sleep associated with the dream state originally evolved out of the necessity for primitive man to arouse periodically in order to survive physical danger. Dream images form an assessment of currently disturbing life situations and, depending on the outcome, the dream may either facilitate full arousal or promote a return to deeper sleep.

Klein (1967) also maintains a close relation between daytime thoughts and the dreams of the night, seeing dreams as one mode of carrying on a series of ideas that may have been set in motion during the day. There is a certain amount of interchangeability among thoughts, fantasies, dreams, and actions in a "series of ideomotor events" that, once set in motion, pushes for completion in and of itself, not in the service of drive reduction. Building on this model, Fiss (1969) conceptualizes the need to dream as a need to complete unfinished tasks. Unresolved (incomplete) cognitive-emotional tasks constitute problems which continue toward completion during the night.

Pearlman (1970), while he, too, believes that dreams play a role in solving problems, distinguishes between their role and that of waking thought. He points out that intellectual insight is different from the emotional kind of "knowing" that makes an insight a part of oneself and proposes that dreams function specifically to facilitate the emotional assimilation that gives adaptive reality to a problem solution.

Breger (1969) emphasizes the problem-
solving aspect of dreams for children in particular, arguing for a developmental function facilitating the child's efforts at mastery. He follows Griffiths (1935) in pointing out that fantasy is the natural mode of thought in early childhood and the primary mode through which children work through emotional problems. Like Piaget, Breger views dreaming as an assimilative form of thought which allows free "experimentation" with problem situations and out of which emerge "fantasy programs" for creative new solutions.

In another paper, Breger (1967) applies the problem-solving approach to an information-processing model and refers it to the solution of affective-personal problems in general, over and above those of child development. He hypothesizes that in dreams, current, affectively arousing problem situations are compared and "tested for fit" with various past "programs" that have served more or less satisfactorily to resolve earlier conflicts. Although couched in different language, this is similar to Ullman's approach and also to the views of French (1952) and French and Fromm (1964), who see dreams as attempted solutions of "focal conflicts." Likewise Greenberg (1970) suggests that in dreams, past and present experiences of a similar emotional nature are brought together and "filed," allowing past experience to facilitate new adaptation and new experience to alter old modes of coping. Breger (1967) points out that the dream state has a number of advantages over waking consciousness for dealing with emotional material: Stored information is more readily available; associational processes are more fluid; the criterion of social acceptability is at a minimum; and a greater variety of means for manipulating symbols is available. The overall effect is a "creative opening up of the memory systems [p. 25]."

Shapiro (1967, 1968) proposes a somewhat different information-processing model. Sleep and dreaming are seen as parts of a total organismic process whereby the nervous system comes increasingly to approximate a "map" of external reality as a result of experience, with corresponding changes in attitudes, feelings, etc. There are two modes of reality testing: the "computing," which corresponds roughly to secondary-process thinking, and the "comparing," which approximates primary-process thinking. Both modes of thought operate during sleep and waking but the former is more dominant during waking, the latter during sleep when new data are compared for relevance with past data and future expectations. A feedback system normally produces alternation between the two modes of thought, both of which are necessary for complete processing of incoming experience. The noxious effects of sleep and/or dream deprivation result from the accumulation of unprocessed data.

Hawkins (1966), in a still different variation of the information-processing theme, conceives the waking state as one of constant input, the dream state as one of sorting and storage required after a certain amount of input has occurred. At the physiological level the sorting-storage process can be seen as central nervous system reorganization. Translated into psychoanalytic language, it is a process of ego re-cathexis but not drive discharge.

In fact, a number of the theorists who propose an environmental-mastery function approach dreams via the concept of ego consolidation. Eriksen (1954) has spoken of the "identity-preserving function of the dream," a view that Jones (1962) has elaborated. According to Jones, the dream advances ego synthesis through its integration of new experiences from waking life into a process whereby the dreamer's "nuclear crises" are resolved. Similarly, Castle (see Footnote 2), who follows Piaget in understanding the dream as egocentric and assimilative thought, suggests that dreams maintain ego continuity by relating new material to the dreamer's past history, thereby allowing the integration of unacknowledged material which would otherwise remain unassimilated. Following the same line of thought, Witkin (1969) hypothesizes that in the course of a dream, the dreamer's position with respect to the central problem is likely to improve, putting him in a position of relatively more mastery than at the beginning of the dream. Witkin emphasizes the dimension of psychological differentiation as a possible equivalent of ego development and cites unpublished work by Eagle showing that the dreamer is more often represented as an active participant (implying relatively more ego de-
development) in the dreams of more differentiated persons.

Lerner (1967) points out that, while differentiation is important, very little attention has been given to the related question of the "reintegration" of experience. Her view, an outgrowth of Rorschach's work, is that dreams contribute to ego development by functioning to reintegrate the body into fantasies which the dreamer cannot act out in waking life. Body image is seen as the basis for ego and, following Rorschach, Lerner proposes that kinesthetic fantasy is required to maintain coherence of body image, hence of personality organization. Immobility is required for the production of kinesthetic fantasy, a condition that is met by the dream state but rarely by other natural conditions.

Some of the mastery-oriented views of dream function concern themselves also with its creative aspects insofar as creativity is a tool in the practical business of gaining control over the environment. Only a few contemporary theorists have approached the contribution of dreams to the creative process as a value in and of itself, adding something new to human life beyond the utilitarian function of survival and environmental control.

Krippner and Hughes (1970) view information processing secondarily as an early function of dreams, which in later life continues to employ a mode of thought that is characteristic of childhood mental processes. This mode rarely appears in adult thinking but is a vital aspect of creative thought. These authors cite studies showing that creative people tend to remember more dreams than noncreative people and to have more exotic dreams; they also mention a number of historical personalities whose discoveries, inventions, and/or artistic products were mediated by dreams.

Piaget (1951) is noteworthy in his view that dreams, along with play, constitute a creative process of construction, an essential aspect of the equilibrative mechanism through which human cognitive development occurs. He recognizes the subjective, affective concerns that are maximally operative in dreams as no less important than environmental reality in the interaction between organism and environment. Like play, dreams may occur in a dynamically compensatory relation to environmental reality. Ironically, the views of Piaget and of Jung, who have been sharply critical of one another, are in many respects more similar than the thought of either of these two Swiss psychologists is to American or to Freudian psychology.

Like Freud's, Jung's theory of dream function is an integral part of a larger view of personality, although it differs quite radically from Freud's. So far as specific functions of the dream are concerned, Jung's view incorporates many of those described above. As Ellenberger (1970) has pointed out,

Jung does, however, propose an overriding principle of dream function within which the specifics operate.

With the rare exceptions noted above, contemporary theories of dream function are characterized by an exclusive concern with adaptation to the world of concrete, outer reality. Jung gives equal emphasis to the world of subjective, inner experience. Further, unlike both Freud and contemporary theorists, Jung retains a deep concern for the irrational side of man's nature. His attitude is that the irrational is, whether we like it or not, and any approach to psychology that tries to exclude it is unable to explain, or even to describe, a great deal of human behavior. Further, through reductionism the richness of human life and values becomes lost.

Jung observed, systematized, and named the phenomena he observed but did not consider himself to be a theorist. Working from observation rather than theory, he felt no necessity to fit later observations into earlier formulations, nor to document his inconsistencies. He said (1953), "I ... prefer the precious gift of doubt, for the reason that it does not violate the virginity of things beyond our ken [p. 8]." Such fluidity has obvious advantages, together with the disadvantage (among others) that it is difficult to become familiar enough with his thinking not to misrepresent it. Nevertheless, an attempt is made here to set down the broad outlines of a model of personality functioning,
including dream function, that emerges from and underlies his observations. Because Jung’s view is little known, it is described in some detail.

For Jung a construct called “the unconscious” is central. Jung’s view of the unconscious is different from Freud’s and the two must be distinguished. It is difficult to define the unconscious in a precise way. As Jung said in a filmed interview, “The trouble with the unconscious is that it is unconscious!” Looking at the unconscious is a little like looking at the back of one’s own neck; it cannot be done directly, but only through an arrangement of mirrors, leaving doubt as to its “true” nature. It is particularly difficult to define in the context of a psychology that has only recently begun to emerge from an empty-organism view to which the notion of consciousness is hardly acceptable, without which the contrasting unconscious cannot be defined. That is, the unconscious comprises “the totality of all psychic phenomena that lack the quality of consciousness [Jung, 1960a, p. 133].”

Nevertheless, as a beginning we can say that the unconscious includes all those aspects of the total personality that are not under conscious control. This includes not only what was once conscious and has been repressed, but also innate potentialities that have not yet become conscious. Obviously, at a superficial level what is unconscious varies from moment to moment depending on fluctuations in attention.

Unconscious contents include, for example, forgotten or repressed memories, psychological representations of bodily functions of which we are not aware, and innate and acquired patterns of behavior. The primary mirrors in which these contents can be observed are affects and images. As the spontaneous activity perhaps furthest from actual or potential conscious control, dream images are one of the best mirrors of the unconscious. As von Franz² puts it,

> Our concept of the unconscious is a borderline concept, for we simply describe by this term a real though invisible fact, for . . . the reality of the unconscious is a concluded reality, not demonstrable directly. You can say that it is what produces dreams, that it is that “X” which arranges the meaningful order of the dream. With a certain technique of interpretation we can bring out of the dream a meaningful connection, so we conclude that there must be something which produces the dream. We have . . . a certain amount of fact and extract therefrom a concept which we call the unconscious [p. 2–2].

Although in their manifestations they are usually mixed together, Jung classifies unconscious contents as of two sorts: personal and collective. The personal unconscious consists partly of the Freudian unconscious, namely, all those contents that have been repressed because they are too painful or incompatible with conscious views to recognize. In addition, there are neutral contents and, more important, memories and parts of the personality which may be acceptable in themselves but have been repressed because they are not in accord with the image of himself that the individual has developed.

The collective unconscious constitutes all those aspects of the psyche that are basic to the human condition, those psychological characteristics that belong to us by virtue of our biological structure. It is part of being human that most of us are born with two legs, two arms, a cerebral cortex, and the capacity to walk upright. These and all other aspects of our biology have certain psychological consequences and lead to typical modes of functioning and patterns of behavior that are reflected in the affects and images of the collective unconscious. Underlying the images are nuclei of energy which give impulse and direction to thought, perception, and at the instinctual level, behavior. These energic nuclei are called archetypes, which are

the necessary a priori determinants of all psychic processes. Just as his instincts compel man to a specifically human mode of existence, so the archetypes force his way of perception and appreciation into specifically human patterns [Jung, 1960a, p. 133].

The concept of the archetype has given rise to much misunderstanding, partly because Jung’s formulation changed in the course of his life and partly because Jungians tend to use the term loosely to refer to images. In fact, an image is never the archetype itself, but simply one of the mirrors from which the construct has been inferred. The archetypal image constitutes the specific form in which an archetype

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may express itself and is not invariant, for it is almost inevitably colored by both cultural and personal determinants. The archetype bears no relation to the notion that acquired ideas can be inherited. The archetype is no more mysterious than the fact that the brain is programmed to work in particular ways and not in others, with particular psychological consequences. For example, one of the most fundamental attributes of the psyche is the tendency to perceive the world in dualities: this and not that, black and white, male and female, high and low, I and not I, etc. It is difficult to conceive of the development of the discriminative, organized thought characteristic of human consciousness without this fundamental tendency as a starting point.

It is notable that Breger (1967), searching for a model more compatible with known biological reality than is Freud's theory of psychic energy, has arrived at the necessity for a concept which very closely approximates that of the archetype:

The difficulties stemming from the psychic-energy theory may be in large part avoided by assuming that what is biologically basic (''instinctual'' in Freud's terms) is the direction given to thought and action by the structure or organization of the nervous system. The ethologists ... take this approach when they posit structural mechanisms underlying the ''fixed action patterns'' that comprise the ''instinctual behavior'' of certain birds and fish. Such structures have evolved, through the process of natural selection, because of the adaptive advantages they confer on the species possessing them... These guiding structures are embodied in the brain and nervous system and have evolved to their present state of complexity over long periods of time, just as have the other biological systems of the body... It is worth stressing that even in the case of the relatively fixed action patterns, it is typically goals or environmental achievements, and not rigid sequences of motor acts, that are built in... These sorts of guiding structures... provide the direction of ongoing activities that is motivation [pp. 11-14].

As is evident from this brief overview, Jung's view of the unconscious is far from Freud's seething cauldron. While recognizing the dark, negative aspects, Jung sees the unconscious in addition as the often untapped source of positive, adaptive, and creative potential; of man's highest possibilities as well as his lowest.

In Jung's view, the personality can be represented, as dreams sometimes represent it, as a large circle within which consciousness is contained as a very small island. The ego, the ''complex of identity'' (see Whitmont, 1969), is the center of that tiny island of consciousness, but not of the whole personality.

It is not unusual for the ego to think that consciousness comprises the total personality and that the vast area outside consciousness is either nonexistent or insignificant. The ego-centric view either ignores manifestations of the unconscious, reduces them to the point of view of the ego, or projects them outward, explaining them as forces acting from the outside. Jung sees this as a drastically limited and limiting approach that reduces man to an infinitesimal portion of his potentiality.

Jung observed that the content of individual dreams appears to bear a relation best described as compensatory to the attitude of ego-consciousness. To understand what he meant by compensation, one must bear in mind the picture of the total personality. The dream presents a point of view from outside consciousness but from within the whole personality. In simple instances the dream content may be directly complementary to the ego's attitude; for example, if the ego says ''I am white,'' the dream may imply that the ego is in fact black. Usually compensation is more subtle, however, and a general statement of the principle is that the dream confronts the ego with what is now most necessary to bring its attitude into accord with the reality of the whole personality, to restore intrapsychic balance. As Jung (1960b) puts it, compensation implies ''balancing and comparing different data or points of view so as to produce an adjustment or a rectification, and... a self-regulation of the psychic system [pp. 287f].'' So long as the aims of the ego remain in relative harmony with the whole, the compensatory process appears to proceed automatically, without conscious attention from the ego. However, if the ego persistently behaves in ways that do violence to the whole, the compensatory activity of the unconscious becomes extreme and may result in neurotic symptoms, psychogenic illness, moods, outbursts of affect, accidents, nightmares, etc. All such symptoms can be understood as compensatory responses to an ego attitude that has become too one-sided. When they arise, serious attention to dreams can provide clues to the inner or outer
changes required to restore more balanced functioning.

Jung did not believe that the dream "tries" to conceal anything. Rather, he saw the dream as the best possible symbolic (usually not literal) expression of a situation. The language of unconscious symbols is different from that of rational, verbal, or linguistic symbols, however, and a good deal of work is required to understand a dream in its own terms. Jung (1966a) says of this:

The true symbol differs essentially from [the sign or symptom], and should be understood as an expression of an intuitive idea that cannot yet be formulated in any other or better way. When Plato, for instance, puts the whole problem of the theory of knowledge in his parable of the cave, or when Christ expresses the idea of the Kingdom of Heaven in parables, these are genuine and true symbols, that is, attempts to express something for which no verbal concept yet exists. If we were to interpret Plato's metaphor in Freudian terms we would naturally arrive at the uterus, and would have proved that even a mind like Plato's was still stuck on a primitive level of infantile sexuality. But we would have completely overlooked what Plato actually created out of the primitive determinants of his philosophical ideas; we would have missed the essential point...[p. 70].

Dreams can, and sometimes do, refer to outer situations and people, and they are often understood as such on what Jung calls the objective level. Often, even when a dream contains people and situations from the outer world, it is more meaningful to understand it in a completely inner way, on the so-called subjective level. Taken subjectively, everything and everyone in the dream embodies an aspect of the larger personality. For example, a very unsociable person may dream about a life-of-the-party friend who embodies his own unlived sociability. Whether it is viewed objectively or subjectively, every dream must be seen in the context of the life situation and conscious attitudes of the dreamer as the principle of compensation implies. It is impossible to be certain of the meaning of a dream out of context.

According to Jung, then, individual dreams function in complex ways to compensate egoconsciousness. We cannot say "in order to compensate!"; compensation is simply a description of what happens. "A dream never says 'you ought' or 'this is the truth.' It presents an image in much the same way as nature allows a plant to grow, and it is up to us to draw conclusions [Jung, 1966b, p. 104]."

When dreams are observed and "related to" (valued, with an attempt to understand them) over a period of time, several things happen. If the ego-attitude has been extremely one-sided, it may move closer to the center of the whole, in which case neurotic symptoms generally disappear. The conscious personality also broadens, so to speak, as more and more of the inner possibilities are accepted and lived. And one begins to notice, longitudinally, a second function of dreams. The specific compensations of each night begin to reveal a complex pattern that appears as if all the conflicting and diverse potentials of the total personality "wanted" to be realized in the life of the individual in what Jung calls the process of individuation. It is as if the point-counterpoint between ego and unconscious were together moving toward some ideal goal of the fulfillment of the whole man. Thus Jung infers a developmental function of dreams which moves, through the whole of life, toward the realization of the total personality. Dement (1966) has said of rapid eye movement (REM) sleep,

never before in the history of biological research has so much been known about something from a descriptive point of view, with so little known at the same time about its function. Yet to doubt that the REM state has a major and vital biological destiny to fulfill is to fly in the face of well-established evolutionary principles [p. 136].

Likewise, given the universality of dreaming, there can be little doubt that dreams themselves play some vital role in man's psychic economy, yet little factual basis has emerged to warrant the choice of one hypothesized function over another. Empirical evidence has been marshalled in support of each of the contemporary theories. Many are not mutually exclusive but differ primarily in emphasis, each illuminating a different aspect of the whole process. Problem-solving, information-processing, and ego-consolidation theories shade into one another and often appear to be discussing similar or identical processes, despite the use of different languages.

There are a few dimensions upon which some theories of dream function differ substantively
from others. One such dimension is that of drive discharge as opposed to balance or dynamic equilibrium as an underlying model. Most drive-discharge approaches, for which Freud's theory is the prototype, tacitly conceive the organism as a relatively static, mechanically closed system that is acted upon from within and without and that moves primarily to rid itself of stimulation in order to return to its original state. Most balance theories, for which Jung's is the psychological prototype, view the organism as a dynamic, biologically active, open system that seeks and interacts with stimulation in such a way as to take in, or integrate, the stimulus in order to arrive at a new and different state of balance. It is noteworthy that Freud, and also Dement (1968) who has been one of the primary contemporary proponents of drive discharge, initially approached the dream via abnormal psychological states. If we begin instead with the normal condition, it is more natural to think, as Fisher (1965) suggests, of a balance mechanism maintaining a steady state of dreaming, with imbalances associated with disturbance.

A second respect in which dream theories clearly differ is in scope. It is a question of aesthetic preference whether one chooses to work with segments or wholes; whether one prefers the sense of certainty that can come from focusing on a limited area or would rather tolerate the ambiguity involved in working with more inclusive concepts. For those who prefer to think on the grand scale, Jung's principles offer a virtually untapped means of encompassing a great deal of existing data, not only on dreams but also in other areas of symbolic expression like fantasy, play, drama, art, mythology, and religion.

A third real difference among theories is the extent to which subjective evidence and non-rational processes are admissible as data. With the exception of the few who have looked at the creative function of the dream, contemporary theorists have stayed very close to a concept of function that derives from biological adaptation to the outside world. The conceptual leap required to think in terms of inner necessity and subjective function does not come easily. Questions like "Where is it leading, psychologically?" and "What is its psychological meaning or value?" have often been confused with metaphysical questions about a prime mover with a purpose outside human psychology. This confusion is unnecessary and leads away from many of the central problems of psychology, the points at which man differs from other animals. Because scientific psychology, which must exclude non-rational methods, tends unnecessarily also to exclude nonrational data, we split into radical positivists on the one side and radical humanists on the other, each leaving out an essential aspect of a complete psychology. Jung has made room for nonrational data in his nevertheless rational theory of dream function.

Within certain very broad limits, our theories reflect our values which in turn affect the values of those who turn to us as experts. American psychology has grown up in an atmosphere of materialistic and utilitarian values which has had no small effect on our preference for materialistic and utilitarian theories. If we believe that control of the environment is the only important human psychological value, then we will consider functional only processes that promote environmental control. If we value artistic creation, harmony with our neighbors, or a sense of meaning in life as important goals in and of themselves, then psychological processes leading to these ends will be considered functional. Dream psychology is one area in which it is difficult for long to close the door to the latter, specifically human functions.

REFERENCES


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